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Recent findings have revived interest in the link between real wage rigidity and employment fluctuations,
in the context of frictional labor markets. The standard search and matching model fails to generate
substantial labor market fluctuations if wages are set by Nash bargaining, while it can generate fluctuations
in excess of what is observed if wages are completely rigid. This suggests that less severe rigidity
may suffice. We study a weaker notion of real rigidity, which arises only in frictional labor markets,
where the wage is the sum of the worker's opportunity cost (the value of unemployment) and a rent.
With wage rigidity this sum is acyclical; we consider rent rigidity, where only the rent is acyclical.
We offer two contributions. First, we derive upper bounds on labor market volatility that apply if the
model of wage determination generates weakly procyclical worker rents, and that are attained by rent
rigidity. Quantitatively, the bounds are tight: rent rigidity generates no more than a third of observed
volatility, an outcome that is closer to Nash bargaining than to wage rigidity. Second, we show that
the bounds apply to a sequence of famous solutions to the bargaining problem under asymmetric
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The role of real wage rigidity in shaping employment ﬂuctuations is a perennial subject of
macroeconomics. Interest in this subject has recently been revived by the ﬁnding that a
conventional calibration of the baseline textbook search and matching model driven by labor
productivity shocks of plausible magnitude and persistence grossly fails to account for the
observed volatility of unemployment and vacancies (Shimer, 2005; Hall, 2005; Costain and
Reiter, 2005). If the standard assumption of Nash-bargained wages is replaced by a rigid
wage, however, then the model is capable of generating ﬂuctuations in excess of what is
observed (Hall, 2005). Thus in principle other models of wage determination may be able
to match observed volatility by generating wages which are not completely yet suﬃciently
rigid. Speciﬁcally, Shimer (2005) asks whether bargaining under asymmetric information may
enhance ampliﬁcation. What characteristics must a model of wage determination have in
order to match observed volatility?
In this paper we study a notion of rigidity weaker than wage rigidity. It arises naturally in
frictional labor markets, where the compensation of the worker is the sum of his opportunity
cost (the value of unemployed job search), and a quasi-rent that accrues when he ﬁnds a job.
With wage rigidity as in Hall (2005) overall compensation is acyclical. Because the value of
unemployment is higher in booms, when jobs are much easier to ﬁnd, the worker’s quasi-rent
must be countercyclical to keep wages constant. We consider rent rigidity, where only the rent
component is acyclical, and ask the following question: must a model of wage determination
generate countercyclical rents to match observed volatility, or is rent rigidity suﬃcient?
Our answer is clear-cut: rent rigidity alone does not come close to matching observed
volatility. Second, we show that many famous and quite diﬀerent solutions to the wage-
setting problem feature at best rent rigidity, but never wage rigidity. We put special but not
exclusive emphasis on environments with asymmetric information, thereby shedding light on
the question raised by Shimer. These are our two main contributions. We now provide some
details.
To show that rent rigidity alone can produce only very limited ampliﬁcation, we derive
two upper bounds on labor market volatility, which apply if the model of wage determination
generates weakly procyclical worker rents, and are attained if rents are rigid. The ﬁrst, weak
1bound applies under mild regularity conditions on the model of wage determination, while
the second, strong bound applies under slightly more demanding conditions. The latter has
the advantage that only information from Shimer’s (2005) calibration is needed to conclude
that it is quantitatively tight : it allows for at most a third of observed volatility. The
same conclusion obtains for the weak bound if one additional element is added to Shimer’s
calibration: empirical information on the average cost of hiring a worker. Thus, unlike wage
rigidity, rent rigidity alone does not enable the model to generate labor market ﬂuctuations
as large as in the data.
The mechanics behind the volatility bounds are as follows. Firms must be compensated
for the initial expense of hiring a worker by receiving quasi-rents over the life of the match.
Assume that worker rents are acyclical, the best case scenario for ampliﬁcation if they cannot
be countercyclical. There are two possibilities, depending on the size of hiring costs.
First, suppose the average cost of ﬁlling a vacancy is small relative to overall gains from
trade in the labor market. In this case only small rents go to ﬁrms in compensation for hiring
costs, and worker rents must be large. In other words, ﬁnding a job yields unemployed workers
a large capital gain, both in booms and recessions as worker rents are acyclical. Now consider
an increase in the job ﬁnding rate. Since worker rents are large and constant, this has a large
positive eﬀect on the opportunity cost of the worker: although the capital gain from ﬁnding a
job does not increase, it is large and more likely to accrue to the worker. Added to the constant
rents from employment, this larger value of unemployment translates one to one into a strong
increase in wages. Thus if an increase in productivity raises the job ﬁnding rate, then this
feedback eﬀect through wages counteracts the increase in proﬁts and thereby mutes vacancy
creation. Notice that this mechanism is similar to the reason why Nash bargaining generates
little ampliﬁcation, with one important diﬀerence: with Nash bargaining the feedback eﬀect
is driven both by an increase in worker rents and by an increase in the job ﬁnding rate. Rigid
rents preserve only the latter eﬀect, but this is strong enough to severely curtail ampliﬁcation.
The weak bound is solely based on this mechanism, which has bite only if hiring cost are
small. Evidence on hiring costs suggest that they are indeed small relative to overall gains
from trade, allowing us to conclude that the weak bound is quantitatively tight.
The strong bound requires no calibration of hiring costs, because it takes into account a
second eﬀect which curtails ampliﬁcation if hiring costs are large relative to overall gains from
2trade in the labor market. In this case ﬁrms must receive large quasi-rents as compensation
for the initial hiring expense. Hence worker rents are small. While this weakens the feedback
eﬀect, it introduces a second eﬀect. The matching technology is such that a vacancy is less
likely to result in a match if the ratio of vacancies to unemployment in the economy is large, a
congestion eﬀect. As a consequence, an increase in the vacancy-unemployment ratio induces
a proportional increase in the cost of ﬁlling a vacancy. If hiring costs are large on average,
this increase is large in absolute value. More importantly, if the increase in the vacancy-
unemployment ratio is caused by an increase in productivity, then the increase in hiring costs
is large relative to the original increase in productivity, once again muting vacancy creation.
To summarize our ﬁrst contribution, rent rigidity is quantitatively much closer to Nash
bargaining than it is to wage rigidity. Thus merely switching to a diﬀerent model of wage
determination does not allow the search and matching model to match observed volatility,
unless the model of wage determination is capable of generating countercyclical worker rents.
Our second contribution is to show that rent rigidity, thus our volatility bounds, apply to an
interesting class of models of wage determination. We focus on environments with asymmetric
information, thereby shedding light on Shimer’s question whether this can amplify the response
of the model to productivity shocks. We assume that, upon being matched, the ﬁrm privately
draws a match-speciﬁc productivity component and the worker a match-speciﬁc amenity value
of the job. The distributions are ﬁxed and independent of (publicly observed) aggregate labor
productivity, and satisfy standard regularity conditions, but are otherwise unrestricted. In this
environment, we study in detail three classical wage determination models. In the monopoly
(or monopsony) solution, where either the ﬁrm or the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage
proposal to the other privately informed party, it follows naturally that worker rents cannot
be countercyclical. If the ﬁrm is making the oﬀer, it becomes more eager to trade in a boom,
and as a consequence it will concede more informational rents to the worker. If the worker is
making the oﬀer, then in a boom once again ﬁrms are more eager to trade, thus the worker is
in a better position to extract rents through more aggressive wage requests. In both cases the
most that can be hoped for is no increase in worker rents in a boom. This basic intuition carries
over when we relax the commitment assumptions associated with take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, and
study strategic bargaining, both repeated one-sided oﬀers (Coase conjecture) and alternating
oﬀers. Finally, in an environment with bilateral asymmetric information, we consider the
3constrained eﬃcient allocation, obtained with the help of a mediator (e.g. an arbitrator in
wage contracting), as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). Again we show that rent rigidity
is the most that can be obtained, for a similar reason: in a boom the mediator desires to induce
more trade, and in order to do so he has to increase informational rents going to workers.
To summarize our second contribution, at the very least asymmetric information intro-
duces, through the distribution of types, many additional degrees of freedom that can be
exploited to generate wage rigidity. In the models we study, however, these degrees of free-
dom are not enough to match observed labor market volatility.
Others have taken up Shimer’s question and investigated whether asymmetric information
enables the search and matching model to produce larger labor market ﬂuctuations. Guerrieri
(2006) studies competitive search equilibrium, whereas we analyze bargaining games with
random matching, making the two analyses complementary. The approaches are diﬀerent,
however. She simulates the model for some speciﬁc distributions of types. We derive labor
market volatility bounds that apply for any distribution of types. In fact, one can show that
our bounds also apply to her model. Her results are consistent with ours: she ﬁnds very little
ampliﬁcation. Kennan (2006) and Menzio (2005b) take a diﬀerent route, relying on exogenous
ﬂuctuations in the shape of the distribution of types as the key driving force of labor market
ﬂuctuations. In contrast, Guerrieri’s and this paper keep the extent of asymmetric information
itself acyclical, examining how the presence of asymmetric information ampliﬁes the response
of the model to a productivity shock.
In Section 2 we introduce the economy. The labor market volatility bounds are derived
in Section 3. In Section 4 we verify these bounds for the models of wage bargaining under
asymmetric information. For simplicity, the analysis in Sections 2–4 restricts attention to
permanent labor productivity shocks. A fortiori, our results also apply to transitory shocks,
which generate a weaker response of the labor market. For completeness, Section 5 formally
derives the bounds for the case of transitory shocks, and provides an illustration using the
monopoly model. Section 6 concludes.
42 The Economy
We consider the baseline search-and-matching model employed by Shimer (2005). We extend
it to allow for bilateral asymmetric information about match-speciﬁc values: the worker may
have private information about how much he likes the job, and the ﬁrm may have private
information about productivity.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of workers and a much larger measure of ﬁrms. All
agents are inﬁnitely-lived, risk neutral and share the discount rate r > 0. Workers can either be
employed or unemployed. An unemployed worker receives ﬂow utility b and searches for a job.
Employed workers receive endogenously determined wage payments from their employers and
cannot search for other jobs. Firms can search for a worker by maintaining an open vacancy
at ﬂow cost c. Free entry implies that the value of an open vacancy is zero. Unemployed
workers u and vacancies v are matched at rate m(u,v) where m is a constant returns to scale
matching function. Let θ ≡ v
u denote the vacancy-unemployment ratio. Then vacancies are
matched at rate m(1/θ,1) ≡ q(θ) and workers are matched at rate m(1,θ) = θq(θ).
Upon being matched, the worker draws a match speciﬁc amenity value z from the distrib-
ution FZ and the ﬁrm draws a match speciﬁc productivity component y from the distribution
FY. The draws are once and for all until the match dissolves. Without loss in generality, the
two distributions have mean zero. Output of the match is given by p + y, so p is ex ante
average labor productivity. However, in general, not all matches are formed and p will not
equal labor productivity averaged across existing matches. We will refer to p as the aggregate
component of labor productivity. The amenity value z adds to the wage to determine the
ﬂow value of employment for the worker. This value z may be private information of the
worker, and the idiosyncratic productivity component y may be private information of the
ﬁrm. Matches are destroyed exogenously at rate δ.
We want to study the magnitude of the response of the labor market to aggregate labor
productivity shocks. One way to proceed would be to specify a stochastic process for labor
productivity and evaluate the labor market volatility it induces. But to obtain upper bounds
on labor market volatility we can simply examine the response of the model to a permanent
5unanticipated productivity shock. This response provides an upper bound to the volatility
induced by a stochastic process with transitory shocks for an intuitive reason: a given increase
in productivity increases incentives to create jobs more the longer it is expected to last.1 Of
course, this simpler approach introduces some slack and it may be possible to obtain tighter
bounds which explicitly account for the degree of persistence of productivity shocks. However,
due to the strong persistence of labor productivity in US data, the gain from such a tighter
bound would be quantitatively small. Thus the analysis in Sections 2–4 analyzes the case
of permanent productivity shocks, as the the cost of doing so is small relative to the gains
in terms of both simplicity and transparency of the analysis. In Section 5 we generalize the
analysis to the case of transitory shocks.
2.2 Wage Determination
Due to search frictions, a match generates quasi-rents. Thus we need to make assumptions
regarding how these rents are split between the worker and the ﬁrm. In other words, we need
a model of wage determination: a mapping of the relevant variables that describe the environ-
ment of the match into a decision whether to trade and how to split the quasi-rents associated
with the match. We work with a general deﬁnition of a model of wage determination, because
our objective is to obtain volatility bounds that apply to entire classes of models of wage
determination.
Here the assumption that productivity shocks are unanticipated and permanent keeps
matters simple: the environment of the match is characterized by only two aggregate variables.
The ﬁrst is productivity p, which is expected to be constant over the life of the match. The
second variable is the endogenous opportunity cost of the worker, which is given by the
utility associated with unemployment U. It will be convenient to let n = rU represent
the opportunity cost of the worker in ﬂow terms. This opportunity cost is a jump variable
1An extreme example may help in building intuition. Suppose matches last for several years on average.
Moreover, suppose that the economy switches between boom and recession every week. Clearly matches
created in booms and recessions are essentially the same, and the additional incentives to create matches in
booms are minimal relative to the case in which the economy switches from boom to recession only every few
years. See Section 5 as well as Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005)
for a more formal development of this point.





and constant along the equilibrium path of the economy following a productivity shock, a
convenient feature of the standard search and matching model.
For each pair of match-speciﬁc values y and z, a model of wage determination maps the
two variables p and n into a trade decision and a split of quasi-rents. It is important to
emphasize that the timing of wage payments over the life of a match is of no importance for
labor market ﬂuctuations. Only the present value of rents going to the worker and the ﬁrm
matter. Thus we formulate a model of wage determination directly in terms of the present
values of rents.
Let G(y,z,p,n) denote the present value of rents going to the worker, J(y,z,p,n) denote
the present value of rents going to the ﬁrm, and x(y,z,p,n) be the probability that a match
is formed conditional on the realizations y and z.
Deﬁnition 1. A model of wage determination is a triple of functions {G,J,x} mapping R4
into R2
+ × [0,1] and satisfying
(r + δ)[G(y,z,p,n) + J(y,z,p,n)] = x(y,z,p,n)(y + z + p − n).
In terms of standard notation, the overall payoﬀ of the employed worker is W = G + U,
so G = W − U is the familiar capital gain an unemployed worker receives from being hired.
Although the timing of wage payments over the life of the match is not important, in order
to provide a link with wages, one can deﬁne the annuity value of the present value of wages
w(p,n,y,z) = (r + δ)G(y,z,p,n) + n − z, which would be the level of the wage if payments
were constant over the life of the match. Figure 1 illustrates the concept of a model of
wage determination. The entire bar represents the value of the match in ﬂow terms, namely
7p+y+z−b. The gray bar represents the opportunity cost of the worker n, and the white bar
the quasi-rents which are split between the ﬁrm and the worker. The annuity value of proﬁts
is (r + δ)J(y,z,p,n), the annuity value of rents going to the worker is (r + δ)G(y,z,p,n).
Adding the opportunity cost n to the latter and subtracting the amenity value of the job z
yields the annuity value of wages w(p,n,y,z).
We illustrate this concept with two speciﬁc models which will serve as important bench-
marks throughout the paper.
Nash bargaining. Under Nash bargaining as commonly employed in the textbook search
and matching model, quasi-rents of the match are shared between the worker and the ﬁrm
with shares β and 1 − β, respectively: in ﬂow terms
(r + δ)G(y,z,p,n) = x(y,z,p,n)β(p − n + y + z),
(r + δ)J(y,z,p,n) = x(y,z,p,n)(1 − β)(p − n + y + z).
The probability of trade is one if forming the match is ex post eﬃcient, zero otherwise:
x(y,z,p,n) = I{p − n + y + z ≥ 0} where I is an indicator function.
Wage Rigidity (Hall (2005)). Hall considers a model without heterogeneity in y and z.
Trade is bilaterally eﬃcient, that is x(p,n) = I{p − n ≥ 0}. Wages are rigid in the following
sense: the annuity value of wages received by the worker in a new match ¯ w does not respond
to changes in p and n, as long as this does not interfere with eﬃcient trade:
(r + δ)G(p,n) =

   
   
¯ w − n p ≥ ¯ w ≥ n,
p − n ¯ w > p ≥ n,
0 otherwise,
(r + δ)J(p,n) =

   
   
p − ¯ w p ≥ ¯ w ≥ n,
p − n p ≥ n > ¯ w,
0 otherwise.
As discussed before, the timing of wage payments through which the annuity value ¯ w is
implemented is not essential here.
We now use the graphical apparatus introduced in Figure 1 to compare these two models
of wage determination. In doing so, we also introduce the key distinction between the two
notions of rigidity contrasted in this paper: wage rigidity vs. rent rigidity. The basic idea is
illustrated in Figure 2, where we abstract from match-speciﬁc draws y and z for simplicity.
8Figure 2: Wage Rigidity vs. Rent Rigidity
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9Each panel encompasses two replicas of Figure 1, one for a low aggregate state pL and one for
a high aggregate state pH > pL.
Panel (a) displays the case of Nash Bargaining. The quasi-rent is split with ﬁxed shares
β and (1 − β). As the overall quasi-rent is procyclical, it follows that the rent going to the
worker is also procyclical.2
Panel (b) shows the case of wage rigidity. Even with rigid wages the opportunity cost of
workers are procyclical in the stochastic equilibrium of the economy.3 As shown in the ﬁgure,
this implies that rents must be countercyclical.
Panel (c) illustrates the contrast with the notion of rent rigidity. Here the rent going to the
worker does not increase in a boom, but the annuity value of wages w(p,n) increases because
the opportunity cost of the worker n does. In this sense, rent rigidity is weaker than wage
rigidity.
It is instructive to relate rent rigidity to Nash bargaining with an ad hoc countercyclical
bargaining share β(p). Shimer (2005) shows in a reduced form experiment that making the
bargaining share somewhat countercyclical helps in generating more volatile unemployment
and vacancies. We emphasize that a countercyclical bargaining share per se does not imply
countercyclical rents. It is clear from Figure 2 (c) that if the bargaining share is only slightly
countercyclical, then rents remain procyclical. As one continues to make the bargaining share
more countercyclical, eventually the qualitative threshold will be crossed at which rents also
become countercyclical. One way of putting the question we will answer in the next section
is then as follows: do we need to cross this threshold in order to generate the observed extent
of volatility?
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
Having deﬁned models of wage determination we can now write down the equilibrium condi-
tions of the model. Before doing so, it is useful to make precise how we will evaluate the extent
of labor market volatility generated by the model. We follow the literature and focus on the
2Procyclicality of the overall quasi-rent is an equilibrium implication of the standard search and matching
model with Nash bargaining, which we discuss in detail in Section 3.
3As we will show in Section 3, in a boom, even though unemployed workers do not get a higher wage should
they ﬁnd a job, they are more likely to ﬁnd a job, so the value of unemployment increases.
10vacancy-unemployment ratio θ = v
u rather than unemployment and vacancies separately. In
US data, detrended vacancies and unemployment are strongly negatively correlated, so their
ratio is especially volatile. Thus the volatility of the v-u ratio presents a convenient way of
capturing the challenge facing the model in a single statistic.4
The model has two endogenous variables: the v-u ratio θ and the opportunity cost of the
worker n. Both immediately jump to their new steady state values in response to a permanent
productivity shock.5 Thus one can compute the elasticity εθ of the v-u ratio with respect to
a productivity shock by diﬀerentiating the steady state equations of the model.
Given a model of wage determination, we can compute the ex ante (before matching)










With this notation we study two steady state conditions in (θ,n).6 First, the free entry
condition, equating the ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy c to the expected capital gain, which is
the rate q(θ) at which open vacancies meet a worker, times the expected value J(p,n) to the
ﬁrm of meeting a worker, taking into account that the match may potentially fail to form:
c = q(θ)J(p,n). (2)
Second, the equation determining the ﬂow value of unemployment as the ﬂow value of leisure
b plus the expected capital gain, the rate θq(θ) at which unemployed workers contact open
vacancies times the expected return G(p,n) from the contact, again taking into account that
the match may potentially fail to form:
n = b + θq(θ)G(p,n). (3)
4Moreover, as discussed by Shimer (2005) the model already does reasonably well at capturing comove-
ment and relative volatility of unemployment and vacancies. In this sense there is little need to examine
unemployment and vacancies separately, and it is suﬃcient to focus on the volatility of the v-u ratio.
5Pissarides (2000), pp. 26-33.
6Once θ = v
u has been computed from these conditions, steady state levels of unemployment u and then
vacancies v = θu are computed using the Beveridge curve u = δ
δ+θq(θ). Since we focus on the v-u ratio we do
not make use of this relationship.
113 Labor Market Volatility Bounds
In this section we derive two bounds on labor market volatility and evaluate them quantita-
tively. These bounds apply to models of wage determination which generate weakly procycli-
cal, that is at best rigid but not countercyclical, worker rents.
So far we have not put any structure on the three functions that make up the model of
wage determination. We now introduce a set of regularity conditions. They are quite weak
and are satisﬁed by all models of wage determination considered in this paper, including Nash
bargaining and wage rigidity. This is important since we are interested in models of wage
determination which lie in some sense in between these two benchmark models.
Condition 1. The model of wage determination {G,J,x} satisﬁes three properties:
(a) The partial eﬀect of aggregate labor productivity p on ex ante worker rents is non-




(b) The partial eﬀect of the worker’s opportunity cost n on ex ante ﬁrm rents is non-positive:




(c) The trade probability x(p,n,y,z) depends on p and n only through their diﬀerence p −
n, and is weakly increasing in both match-speciﬁc outcomes, the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic
productivity component y and the worker’s amenity value for the job z.
Part (a) requires that holding worker opportunity cost n constant, an increase in labor
productivity will not reduce worker rents. Importantly, this does not imply procyclical worker
rents: under wage rigidity the partial eﬀect of labor productivity is exactly zero; thus worker
rents are countercyclical as worker opportunity costs n increase in booms. Similarly, part (b)
does not imply that ﬁrm proﬁts are countercyclical. Again wage rigidity represents the extreme
case in which the partial eﬀect is zero; ﬁrm rents under wage rigidity are then procyclical as
the productivity component p is higher in booms.
Both Nash bargaining and wage rigidity feature ex post eﬃcient trade, that is trade occurs
if and only if p−n+y+z ≥ 0. Ex post eﬃciency immediately implies part (c). The converse
12is not true, that is part (c) is weaker than ex post eﬃciency. We will see that part (c)
holds for all the models featuring ex post ineﬃcient trade considered in Section 4. For an
interpretation of this property, ﬁrst consider comparative statics with respect to p and n. If p
and n increase by the same amount, this shifts up the location of the bargaining problem to
a higher level of productivity and opportunity cost, but leaves the average gains from trade
p − n unchanged. Condition 1 (c) requires that such a shift leaves the probability of trade
unaﬀected. The second requirement of Condition 1 (c) speciﬁes that matches are positively
selected. Let ¯ y(p,n) ≡ ξ(p,n)−1   
x(p,n,y,z)ydFY (y)dFZ(z) be the average match speciﬁc
productivity component conditional on trade. Condition 1 (c) implies ¯ y(p,n) ≥ 0.7 Similarly,
it implies that the conditional mean amenity value ¯ z(p,n) is non-negative.
We now derive two bounds on labor market volatility, referred to as weak and strong,
respectively. The weak bound is less tight theoretically, and more empirical information must
be utilized in order to conclude that it is tight quantitatively. The second bound holds under
more stringent conditions on the model of wage determination.
3.1 Weak Labor Market Volatility Bound
The ﬁrst bound applies to all models of wage determination that satisfy the following property
(along with regularity Condition 1).
Deﬁnition 2. (Increasing Worker Rents) In a model of wage determination {G,J,x},







Notice that this property is stronger than Condition 1 (a): the partial eﬀect of aggregate
labor productivity p on worker rents is not only non-negative, but it is required to exceed in
absolute value the eﬀect of the worker’s opportunity cost n on worker rents.
To explain the role of Increasing worker rents, it is useful to deﬁne the following property
of the equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3. (Procyclical Worker Rents) Worker rents are Procyclical in equilibrium













As will emerge clearly from the derivation, the weak labor market volatility bound applies
whenever worker rents are Procyclical in equilibrium. Procyclicality, however, is a feature
of the equilibrium and not a condition that can be veriﬁed only examining the model of
wage determination. Increasing worker rents is a suﬃcient condition on the model of wage
determination which insures that worker rents are Procyclical in equilibrium.
We obtain the volatility bound for θ in three steps. First we show that if worker rents are
Procyclical and the elasticity εθ = dlnθ/dlnp has to be positive, then the opportunity cost
of the worker responds less than one for one to an increase in productivity, that is dn
dp < 1.
Second we transform this inequality for dn
dp into the desired upper bound on εθ, which applies
whenever worker rents are Procyclical. Finally we show that if worker rents are Increasing,
then they are Procyclical.
First, we show that εθ > 0 implies dn
dp < 1. If the increase in the outside option of the
worker in a boom was so large as to overturn the increase in productivity, then ﬁrm rents




dp as the feedback eﬀect, as it captures how an increase in proﬁts that raises vacancies and
thereby the job ﬁnding rate feeds back negatively into proﬁts through a higher opportunity
cost of workers. To see that ﬁrm proﬁts must shrink, namely dJ
dp ≤ 0, if dn
dp ≥ 1, ﬁrst suppose
that ∂J
∂p ≤ 0. Then both the increase in productivity and — by virtue of part Condition 1
(b) — the increase in n reduce ﬁrm proﬁts. If instead ∂J
∂p ≥ 0 it follows from parts (a) and
(c) of Condition 1 that the sum of worker and ﬁrm rents must be increasing in p − n. In this
case dn
dp ≥ 1 implies that total rents fall, and Procyclical worker rents imply that once again
ﬁrm rents must decrease. Through the entry condition (2) lower ﬁrm rents in turn imply that
labor market tightness must fall, contradicting εθ > 0.
Second, from Equation (3), it is clear that an increase in worker rents raises the opportunity
cost n: a larger capital gain from ﬁnding a job increases the utility of unemployed workers.













q denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies,
evaluated at the initial equilibrium. Similarly, θ, q, and G are the v-u ratio, the contact rate of
vacancies, and worker rents, all evaluated at the initial equilibrium. Inequality (4) holds as an
equality if worker rents are completely rigid. Notice that even in that case dn
dp is positive: the
value of unemployment increases because it is easier to ﬁnd a job. Moreover, a large elasticity
εθ implies that the job ﬁnding rate responds strongly to an increase in productivity, leading
to a larger value of dn
dp. Combining (4) with dn
dp < 1 from the ﬁrst step implies an upper bound









The interpretation of this upper bound is straightforward. If η is large, then the job ﬁnding
rate responds strongly to an increase in θ because vacancies are very productive in the creation
of matches. This is associated with a stronger feedback eﬀect and leads to a tighter bound on
εθ. If the job-ﬁnding rate θq is larger, then a given percentage increase in θ translates into a
larger increase in the chances of ﬁnding a job, also tightening the bound. Finally, the bound
is tighter if the level of rents going to the worker is higher. If the capital gain of ﬁnding a job
is zero, then a higher job-ﬁnding rate does not translate into a higher value of unemployment
because there is nothing to be gained from ﬁnding a job.
To turn (5) into a bound that can be evaluated quantitatively we need to calibrate worker
rents G. For this purpose we introduce some additional notation. First the annuity value of
wages in the initial equilibrium is w ≡ (r + δ)ξ
−1G + n − ¯ z (recall that the average amenity
value ¯ z must be deducted from the average ﬂow utility of an employed worker in order to
obtain wages). Next deﬁne the job ﬁnding rate
f ≡ θqξ,
which is the product of the matching rate θq and the probability of match formation ξ. Finally
deﬁne observed average labor productivity, the average of p+y conditional on trade ¯ p ≡ p+¯ y.
Using this notation together with Equation (3) we can rewrite (5) as
εθ ≤
¯ p − ¯ y
w + ¯ z − b
1
η
r + δ + f
f
.
At this point we use Condition 1 (c): the fact that matches that do form are positively selected
15implies that ¯ y ≥ 0 and ¯ z ≥ 0. This yields
εθ ≤
¯ p
¯ p − b




r + δ + f
f
≡ ¯ εθ,WEAK.
The third and ﬁnal step is to show that if worker rents are Increasing, then they are
Procyclical. Suppose not. This can only happen if dn
dp > 1. Increasing worker rents in
conjunction with Condition 1 (c) imply ∂J
∂p + ∂J
∂n ≤ 0. Thus dn
dp > 1 and Condition 1 (b)
imply that ﬁrm rents decrease in response to an increase in p. For ﬁrms to be willing to post
vacancies in the face of lower rents the v-u ratio must fall, that is equilibrium condition (2)
implies εθ ≤ 0. But with both worker rents and the job ﬁnding rate countercyclical it follows
from Equation (3) that the utility of unemployed workers must be lower, that is dn
dp ≤ 0, a
contradiction.
We have established the following:
Proposition 1. (Weak Volatility Bound) If the model of wage determination satisﬁes
Condition 1 and worker rents are Procyclical, then εθ ≤ ¯ εθ,WEAK. If worker rents are Increas-
ing, then they are Procyclical.
Our approach in Section 4 is to show that a given model of wage determination under
asymmetric information satisﬁes both Condition 1 and Increasing worker rents. Proposition 1
then allows us to conclude that this model of wage determination is subject to the weak labor
market volatility bound. Proposition 1 can also be applied in a diﬀerent way: if a model of
wage determination satisﬁes Condition 1 but generates ampliﬁcation in excess of the bound,
then it must produce countercyclical worker rents. That is, ﬁnding a job yields a larger gain
in a slump. We illustrate this application with the following model of wage determination.
Outside Option Principle. Hall and Milgrom (2007) consider the bargaining theory of
Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986). According to this theory, the relevant threat
point of the worker is not unemployment but delay of bargaining, say a strike. Let bs be the
ﬂow payoﬀ of the worker during a strike, which could be diﬀerent from the ﬂow payoﬀ during
unemployment b. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which yields a wage
w(p,n) = bs + 1
2(p − bs). This is similar in form to the Nash bargaining wage, but with the
strike value bs replacing the opportunity cost n. The model is given by x(p,n) = I{p−n ≥ 0}
16and





2(p + bs) − n 1
2(p + bs) ≥ n,
0 otherwise,
(r + δ)J(p,n) =

   
   
1
2(p − bs) 1
2(p + bs) ≥ n,
p − n p ≥ n ≥ 1
2(p + bs),
0 otherwise.
Condition 1 is easily veriﬁed, but since ∂G
∂p + ∂G
∂n = −1
2 worker rents are not Increasing.






the model can generate a volatility exceeding the bound ¯ εθ,WEAK, by choosing bs suﬃciently
close to p. However, Proposition 1 allows us to conclude that the only way this can occur is
if the model generates countercyclical worker rents in equilibrium. This is not obvious, as in
principle the model can generate procyclical worker rents if bs is suﬃciently close to b.8
3.2 Strong Labor Market Volatility Bound
We now derive a second volatility bound which is stronger in that it uses more theory, is
qualitatively tighter. Moreover, less empirical information is required to conclude that it is
quantitatively tight.
As the starting point, notice that the derivation of the weak bound was based almost
entirely on the second equilibrium condition (3). The entry condition (2) was used only to a
limited extent, to show that a more than one for one response of opportunity costs dn
dp ≥ 1
is inconsistent with a positive elasticity εθ. In particular, the weak bound is based on the
feedback eﬀect arising from condition (3). As we discussed this eﬀect is strong if the annuity
value of wages and thus worker rents are large. As the annuity value of wages approaches b (or
equivalently worker rents approach zero) the feedback eﬀect vanishes and the bound becomes
very loose, asymptoting to inﬁnity.
We now show that if worker rents are small, then a second eﬀect neglected by the weak
bound comes into play and limits ampliﬁcation. The strong bound is obtained by fully ex-
ploiting the entry condition. The mechanics are as follows. If total rents from a match are
8One can check that worker rents are procyclical for b = bs under Shimer’s calibration.
17not negligible and worker rents are small, then ﬁrm rents are large. Because of free entry, ﬁrm
rents exactly equal the expected cost of hiring a worker. This cost is given by c
qξ, that is the
ﬂow cost multiplied by the average duration of a vacancy. Notice that an increase in the v-u
ratio makes the recruiting eﬀort of ﬁrms less eﬀective due to a congestion eﬀect: an increase
in θ by one percent increases hiring costs by 1 − η percent. Thus if ﬁrm rents and thereby
hiring costs are large and if θ is strongly procyclical, then the increase in hiring costs in a
boom will be large both in absolute terms and relative to the increase in productivity. For this
to be consistent with the entry condition it must be that ﬁrm rents are highly responsive to
productivity, that is ∂J
∂p must be large. However, it is easy to see that under both wage rigidity
and Nash bargaining the response of ﬂow ﬁrm rents (r + δ)∂J
∂p cannot exceed the probability
of trade. This motivates the following regularity condition.





To see that this condition holds in the case of wage rigidity, notice that the probability of
trade is ξ = 1. Since (r + δ)∂J
∂p = 1 Condition 2 holds with equality. For Nash bargaining
(r + δ)∂J
∂p = (1 − β)ξ, so Condition 2 holds with some slack. More generally, notice that ex






= ξ. This follows from the envelope theorem
which implies that the indirect eﬀect of an increase in p through the adjustment of the trading
decision is zero. Thus Condition 2 follows from ex post eﬃcient trade in conjunction with
Condition 1 (a). In this case Condition 2 is innocuous. Moreover, we will see that Condition
2 also holds for some models with asymmetric information despite ex post ineﬃcient trade.
But while Condition 1 applies to all models of wage determination considered in this paper,
we do ﬁnd some cases in which Condition 2 fails. Thus the ﬁrst bound retains a separate role
to deal with such cases.
To derive the strong bound we log-diﬀerentiate the system of Equations (2)–(3) with
respect to productivity p and solve for the elasticity εθ:
εθ =
¯ p − ¯ y


























equals one if the equilibrium exhibits acyclical worker rents and if the trading decision is ex
post eﬃcient. Thus deviations of φ from one capture departures from these two properties. We
ﬁrst show that Increasing worker rents in conjunction with Condition 2 implies φ ≥ 1. First
recall from Proposition 1 that if worker rents are Increasing, then they are Procyclical. This
allows us to bound the numerator in Equation (6) from below by (r + δ)∂J










≤ 0. Together with Condition 2 this insures that the denominator
is bounded from above by ξ. Thus φ ≥ 1 as desired. When this is combined with positive




¯ p − b
 
¯ p − w
¯ p − b
1
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f       
feedback
 −1
≡ ¯ εθ,STRONG. (7)
The ﬁrst term
¯ p
¯ p−b of the product in Equation (7) captures the percentage increase in the ﬂow
gain from market activity ¯ p − b associated with a percentage increase in labor productivity
¯ p. If b is close to ¯ p, then the ﬂow gains from market activity are very elastic with respect
to productivity. Thus everything else equal a large b enables the model to generate large
ﬂuctuations in the v-u ratio.





f . The latter is familiar from the ﬁrst bound and captures the feedback eﬀect. The
weight on this term in the mean is the fraction of the gains from market activity going to
the worker w−b
¯ p−b: as was reﬂected in the ﬁrst bound, the feedback eﬀect puts a tighter limit
on ampliﬁcation if the annuity value of wages is large. The ﬁrst term of the weighted average
1
1−η is new and captures the congestion eﬀect. This eﬀect is more severe if η is low, that is if
an increase in the v-u ratio has a strong negative eﬀect on the rate at which vacancies contact
workers. The weight on this term is the fraction of the gains from market activity going to
ﬁrms. Recall that this fraction is large precisely when the level of hiring costs is large. A large
level of hiring costs combined with a low η means that the absolute increase in hiring costs in
a boom is large relative to the increase in productivity, putting a tight limit on ampliﬁcation.
19We have established the following:9
Proposition 2. (Strong Volatility Bound) If the model of wage determination satisﬁes
Conditions 1 and 2 and if worker rents are Increasing, then εθ ≤ ¯ εθ,STRONG.
We now show how the strong bound can be attained. This is of theoretical interest because
one would like to know whether the bound is tight for the class of models of wage determination
satisfying Conditions 1 and 2. It will also turn out to be of some interest quantitatively to
the extent that the bound allows for some ampliﬁcation vis-a-vis Nash bargaining.
Complete Rent Rigidity. Consider the following mode of wage determination. Trade is
bilaterally eﬃcient, that is x(p,n) = I{p−n ≥ 0}. The worker receives a ﬁxed ﬂow rent g > 0
which does not respond to changes in p and n, unless it would interfere with eﬃcient trade:
(r + δ)G(p,n) =

   
   
g p ≥ n + g,
p − n n + g > p ≥ n,
0 otherwise,




p − n − g p ≥ n + g,
0 otherwise.
Notice that worker rents are acyclical by construction. Conditions 1 and 2 are easily veriﬁed.
It is straightforward to check that the elasticity of the v-u ratio generated by the model is
exactly ¯ εθ,STRONG, where the annuity value of wages is related to the rent parameter g through
the formula g = r+δ
r+δ+f(w − b). This model is ad hoc in the same way as Hall’s rigid wage. In
analogy to Hall (2005), one may think of it as an alternative equilibrium selection of a double
auction, and interpret it as a norm or social consensus which applies to worker rents rather
than the level of wages. An alternative well-known model of wage determination that delivers
complete rent rigidity is the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) eﬃciency wage shirking model.10
9The weak bound applies not only if worker rents are Increasing, but also if they are just Procyclical. For
the strong bound we can obtain an analogous result, but it requires a stronger version of Condition 2. If







≤ 0. To insure
that φ ≥ 1 we need to strengthen (r+δ)∂J






≤ ξ. If the model of wage determination
satisﬁes this property along with Condition 1, then the strong bound applies if worker rents are Procyclical.
10 According to Equation (5) in their paper, the worker receives a ﬂow rent g =
(r+δ+q)e
q where e is the
cost to the worker of providing eﬀort, and q is the rate at which a shirking worker is caught. Thus rents are
completely rigid in response to a shock to aggregate labor productivity as long as both e and q do not vary
with productivity p.
20An interesting question is whether the bound can be attained not only through complete
rent rigidity, but also by the models of wage determination under asymmetric information
considered in Section 4. There we provide an aﬃrmative answer for the monopoly model.
The model of complete rent rigidity attains the strong bound. The diﬀerence between
the two bounds is that the ﬁrst bound neglects the congestion eﬀect. This implies that the
weak bound cannot be attained by any model of wage determination that generates a non-
zero congestion eﬀect. The congestion eﬀect is positive as long as ∂J
∂p is ﬁnite. With ex post
eﬃcient trade this is always the case. Since the model of complete rent rigidity features ex
post eﬃcient trade, it cannot attain the weak bound. Introducing ex post ineﬃcient trade in
an ad hoc fashion into the model of complete rent rigidity would enable it to attain the weak
bound.11
3.3 Calibration
We now evaluate the two volatility bounds quantitatively and compare them to Nash bargain-
ing and wage rigidity. To make this comparison we need to compute the elasticities of the
v-u ratio associated with these models of wage determination. In analogy to the bounds we
express these elasticities in terms of the parameters η, p, b, r, δ, together with the equilibrium
job ﬁnding rate f and the equilibrium annuity value of wages w. The formulas are written to




























for Nash bargaining and wage rigidity, respectively.12 Nash bargaining diﬀers from the strong
bound through a higher weight on the term 1
1−η, which stems from the procyclicality of rents.
Wage rigidity diﬀers through a zero weight on 1
η
r+δ+f
f , as it completely severs the feedback
eﬀect. Our quantitative evaluation is based Shimer’s (2005) calibration, which is displayed
in Table 1. The model period is a quarter. The interest rate is chosen to match an annual
discount factor of 0.953. Shimer infers time series of quarterly separation and job ﬁnding
11Let ξ(p−n) = eζ(p−n) be the probability of trade. Set (r+δ)J(p,n) = ξ(p−n)(p−n)−g if ξ(p−n)(p−n) ≥ g,
setting it to zero otherwise. Then the weak bound is attained for ζ → ∞.
12In the case of Nash bargaining the annuity value of wages is related to the bargaining parameter through
w =
(r+δ)[(1−β)b+βp]+βfp










rates from BLS data. He sets δ equal to the average separation rate of 0.1. The data on
the job ﬁnding rate together with data on the v-u ratio is used to estimate the matching
function elasticity, yielding η = 0.28. Given the value of the matching function elasticity,
Shimer chooses the Nash bargaining parameter β such that the Hosios (1990) condition is
satisﬁed, that is β = 1 − η = 0.72.13 It is more diﬃcult to calibrate the value of non-market
activity b. If one is willing to assume that it stems solely from unemployment beneﬁts one
can use replacement rates. Proceeding along these lines Shimer sets b
¯ p = 0.4. We return to
the calibration of this parameter below.
Notice that the vacancy cost c does not appear in the table. It is pinned down by calibrating
the model to match the average job ﬁnding rate f = 1.35.
Shimer’s calibration provides all the information needed to evaluate the bounds except
for the annuity value of wages (normalized by productivity) w
¯ p. In his calibration of the
model with Nash bargaining Shimer does not need to directly calibrate the annuity value of
wages since it is pinned down by choosing the bargaining parameter β to satisfy the Hosios
condition. The implied value is
wNB
p = 0.9826. When calibrating the model with a rigid wage,
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2004) must choose a level of the rigid wage and thus of the annuity
value of wages. They sidestep the issue of independently calibrating the wage by adopting
the level implied by the model with Nash bargaining under the Hosios condition. We could
proceed in the same way. It is desirable, however, to calibrate the wage level independently,
13Shimer assumes a Cobb-Douglas matching function, for which β = 1 − η implies social eﬃciency of the
equilibrium.




¯ p − w
r + δ
. (8)
The left hand side is the expected cost of hiring a worker, that is the ﬂow cost c times the
expected duration of a vacancy 1
qξ. Over the life of the match the ﬁrm receives the ﬂow ¯ p−w.
The present value of this ﬂow must be such that the ﬁrm recoups the initial hiring costs. Both
Silva and Toledo (2007) as well as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) utilize evidence provided by
Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) which in turn is based on the 1982 Employment Opportunity
Project and the 1992 Small Business Administration survey. This evidence suggests that the
average labor cost of hiring a worker corresponds to between 3 and 4.5 percent of the quarterly
wage. This does not include costs such as advertisement, and citing further evidence Silva
and Toledo (2006) argue that total hiring costs could be as high as 14 percent of the quarterly
wage. This is close to the estimate of 13 percent provided by Abowd and Kramarz (2003)
for French data. For our purposes it suﬃces to identify a region in which hiring costs could
reasonably lie. Proceeding conservatively based on the evidence above we consider hiring costs
between 3 percent and 30 percent of quarterly wages. Using Equation (8) this yields a range
 
wmin
¯ p , wmax
¯ p
 
= [0.9675,0.9967] for the wage w
¯ p. Notice that the wage level
wNB
¯ p implied by
the model with Nash bargaining under the Hosios condition is contained in this range and
corresponds to hiring costs of 16 percent of quarterly wages.
Figure 3 plots the volatility bounds as a function of the wage w
¯ p together with the elasticities
implied by wage rigidity and Nash bargaining. The large elasticities generated by wage rigidity
make it convenient to use a logarithmic scale. The range
 
wmin
¯ p , wmax
¯ p
 
based on the evidence
on hiring costs is indicated by the shaded area. For US data Shimer ﬁnds that the relative
volatility of the v-u ratio and labor productivity (as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation) is
σθ
σp = 19, and this level is indicated by a horizontal line as a point of reference. The downward
sloping dashed line represents Nash bargaining. The wage
wNB
¯ p associated with the bargaining
share β = 0.72 implies an elasticity of 1.72. This is an order of magnitude smaller than the
relative volatility of the v-u ratio and productivity in the data, which is precisely the failure of
the model emphasized by Shimer (2005). The upward sloping dashed-dotted line represents
the elasticity generated by wage rigidity. The range of elasticities induced by a rigid wage in
the shaded region is [42.74,420.88]. Thus for reasonable values of hiring costs a rigid wage
23Figure 3: Volatility Bounds
 
 










generates an elasticity εθ in excess of the empirical relative volatility
σθ
σp. This suggests that
wage rigidity generates more than enough ampliﬁcation, leaving room for the possibility that a
weaker form of rigidity could suﬃce to match observed labor market volatility.14 In particular,
one may ask whether rent rigidity is capable of doing so.
A negative answer to this question is provided by the plots of the two volatility bounds.
Both are represented by solid lines, the strong bound with crosses. Over the shaded region of
interest the two bounds are quantitatively close and vary little: the weak bound ranges from
6.48 to 6.82 whereas the strong bound ranges from 5.88 to 6.38. Thus for reasonable values of
hiring costs, models of wage determination that generate procyclical worker rents can generate
at most a third of observed volatility.15 In other words, replacing Nash bargaining by a model
14 The range of elasticities [42.74,420.88] overstates the case that a rigid wage generates more than enough
ampliﬁcation. As discussed before, the case of permanent shocks provides an upper bound for the case in which
persistence is calibrated to US data. To investigate this issue we calibrated the rigid wage model following
the approach of Shimer (2005) for wage levels in the shaded range and obtained the range [20.8,57.9] for the
relative coeﬃcient of variation σθ
σp
µp
µθ. Thus it is still the case that a rigid wage generates relative volatility in
excess of what is observed.
15 Mortensen and Nagypal (2005) argue that 7.52 is a more appropriate target for the elasticity εθ than
the value of 19 implicit in Shimer (2005). Their argument is based on the relatively low empirical correlation
24with rigid rents does not provide a silver bullet for resolving the inability of the model to
match observed labor market ﬂuctuations. Nevertheless, some ampliﬁcation vis-a-vis Nash
bargaining is not ruled out by the bound. Thus it is of interest whether the bound can be
attained. We have already shown that the strong bound can be attained with complete rent
rigidity, and in Section 4 we show how it is attained by a model of wage determination under
asymmetric information.16
Notice that the two bounds coincide for w
¯ p = 1. Recall that the diﬀerence between the
two bounds is that the weak bound neglects the congestion eﬀect. This eﬀect is zero for
w
¯ p = 1. If the model is calibrated to a lower annuity value of wages w
¯ p < 1, then a gap appears
between the two bounds. The weak bound increases as it only reﬂects the feedback eﬀect,
whose strength is reduced if wages and thus worker rents are small. It asymptotes to inﬁnity
because the feedback eﬀect disappears as the annuity value of wages approaches the value of
non-market activity b. In contrast, the strong bound is an increasing function of the annuity
value of wages. Recall from Equation (7) that the strong bound is a weighted average of the
feedback and the congestion eﬀect. The weight on the feedback eﬀect is an increasing function
of the annuity value of wages. Thus the slope of the strong bound depends on which of the two
eﬀects puts a tighter limit on labor market ﬂuctuations. The plot shows that the congestion
eﬀect is more severe: calibrating the model to match a lower annuity value of wages reduces
the ampliﬁcation generated by rent rigidity. Setting w = b puts all weight on the congestion




1−η = 2.31; putting all weight on the feedback eﬀect by






f = 6.45. Importantly, the strong bound is ﬁnite
between labor market tightness and labor productivity, suggesting that part of ﬂuctuations in labor market
tightness is due to other shocks. Rent rigidity comes close to attaining their 7.52 target. Thus while rent
rigidity alone cannot enable the model solely driven by productivity shocks to match observed volatility, a
model with rigid rents and multiple shocks could get close. On the other hand, the appropriate target for εθ
could be even higher than Shimer’s 19 if the low empirical correlation between labor market tightness and
labor productivity reﬂects measurement error in the latter rather than other shocks.




simulations with productivity persistence calibrated to US data is necessarily close to the strong bound, for
the reason already discussed in Footnote 14. Simulating the model for the usual range of wages, following the
approach of Shimer (2005), yields yields the range [5.18,6.30] for the relative coeﬃcient of variation, compared
to the corresponding values for the bound [5.88,6.38]. Thus the simulated model comes very close to attaining
bound.
25irrespective of the annuity value of wages. In this sense it requires less empirical information
than the weak bound. In particular, using only parameters from Shimer’s calibration and
without calibrating hiring costs we can conclude that models of wage determination subject
to the strong bound cannot generate more than a third of observed volatility.
The congestion eﬀect is maximized if the annuity value of wages w equals the value of
non-market activity. In this case Nash bargaining, rent rigidity and wage rigidity all coincide.
The plot of the strong bound illustrates that rent rigidity lies between Nash bargaining and
wage rigidity, but quantitatively it is much closer to the former (remember that the scale is
logarithmic).
Why does the congestion eﬀect put a tighter limit on ﬂuctuations than the feedback eﬀect in




f ≫ r+δ this is well approximated by 1
η. The strength of the congestion eﬀect is determined
by 1
1−η. Thus which one of the two eﬀects puts a tighter bound on ampliﬁcation in essence
just depends on the matching function elasticity η. If η is below 1
2 as in Shimer’s calibration,
then an increase in the number of vacancies primarily causes congestion with little eﬀect on
the job ﬁnding rate and a correspondingly weak feedback eﬀect. If instead η is above 1
2 an
increase in vacancies is associated with a strong response of the number of matches, causing
little congestion while substantially increasing the job ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers.
Since the elasticity η plays such an important role it is useful to consider how changing this
parameter aﬀects the bounds. This is particularly important since Shimer’s value lies at
the low end of the reasonable range of [0.3,0.5] identiﬁed in the survey by Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001). In Figure 4 we consider the other end of the spectrum η = 0.5. The strong
bound is ﬂat as the congestion and feedback eﬀects are now roughly balanced. The feedback
eﬀect is strengthened relative to Shimer’s calibration, and now generates a much tighter bound
over the shaded region of about 3.61. This is not much higher than the maximal elasticity
of 3.33 which Nash bargaining is able to generate, albeit only for very large values of hiring
costs.
Next we discuss the role of the value of non-market activity b. Our two bounds and the
elasticities of the v-u ratio generated by Nash bargaining and wage rigidity have one thing in
common: they all include the term
¯ p
¯ p−b. To understand the role of this term it is useful to
think of the gains from market activity ¯ p−b as the driving force of the model. Then
¯ p
¯ p−b is the
26Figure 4: Volatility Bounds η = 0.5
 
 










elasticity of this driving force with respect to productivity. If b is close to ¯ p, then even small
ﬂuctuations in productivity can generate large ﬂuctuations in the driving force of the model.
Thus even if the model does not strongly amplify ﬂuctuations in ¯ p − b it could still generate
large labor market ﬂuctuations for suﬃciently large b. In Shimer’s calibration
¯ p
¯ p−b = 1.67
is small. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) show that with b
¯ p = 0.955 even Nash bargaining
can match observed labor market ﬂuctuations. Analogously one may ask: at what value of
non-market activity can the model of complete rent rigidity match observed volatility? For
an annuity value of wages
wNB
¯ p = 0.9826 the answer is b
¯ p = 0.828.
4 Wage Determination under Asymmetric Information
We now consider classic models of bargaining with incomplete information, that have been
studied very extensively. We want to check whether these models exhibit the properties, such
as Increasing worker rents, under which the labor market volatility bounds apply. These are
comparative statics properties of equilibrium outcomes of the bargaining game. Comparative
statics are meaningful only when the equilibrium prediction is unique. Thus, we focus our
attention on bargaining protocols for which the literature has established outcome uniqueness,
27possibly subject to appropriate reﬁnements: one-sided oﬀers with and without commitment
to the oﬀer, strategic bargaining with one-sided asymmetric information, and the constrained
eﬃcient allocation maximizing expected gains from trade. In each case, the comparative
statics properties of the unique equilibrium outcome are unknown, so we have to derive them
anew.
There is an additional reason to focus on unique outcomes. If the bargaining game has
multiple outcomes, then this could be exploited to generate ampliﬁcation by selecting an
outcome favorable to ﬁrms in booms and an outcome favorable to workers in recessions.
However, asymmetric information is not needed to do this. In fact, Hall (2005) exploits
multiplicity in this way to provide a foundation for wage rigidity in the model with symmetric
information. He assumes that the wage is set through a double auction. The key feature of
the double auction under symmetric information environment is that any split of the gains
from trade is an equilibrium. Thus one can select the rigid wage as the equilibrium for all
combinations of p and n, as long as this wage is always in the bargaining set [n,p]. Since
multiplicity can be used to generate the observed amount of volatility even under symmetric
information, the only interesting question is whether models with asymmetric information are
capable of doing so without exploiting multiplicity. Hence our focus on bargaining protocols
with unique outcomes.
In our setting, private information concerns the idiosyncratic productivity component of
the match, y, and amenity value for the worker, z. The distributions FY and FZ have support
[y, ¯ y] and [z, ¯ z], respectively, with y, z, ¯ y, ¯ z ∈ ¯ R. We now introduce a standard technical
assumption about private information.







Z(z) are strictly increasing and continuously diﬀerentiable on [y, ¯ y] and [z, ¯ z], re-
spectively.
For each of the rent-sharing models that we examine, we proceed as follows: we show that
Condition 1 (c) holds, and then that expected rents are a function of p and n only through
their diﬀerence p − n, with G′(p − n) ≥ 0 and J ′(p − n) ≥ 0. This is all that we need for the













′(p − n) ≥ 0
which is Condition 1 (b). For the second bound, we also verify Condition 2 directly.
4.1 Monopoly
First, we consider the simplest game in which the privately uninformed party makes a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the informed party. This is the model suggested by Shimer (2005) in
his conjecture that asymmetric information may generate ampliﬁcation. In this model, the
relationship ends if the informed party rejects the oﬀer. In other words, the uninformed party
can commit not to make another oﬀer if its ﬁrst oﬀer is rejected. This game has a unique
equilibrium, which is constrained ex ante eﬃcient in the sense that the oﬀer-making party’s
welfare cannot be improved further given information asymmetry (Satterthwaite and Williams
(1989)). Yet, it does not maximize ex ante gains from trade, due to the monopoly distortion.
We analyze separately the two cases of unilateral wage oﬀer by the ﬁrm and wage request
by the worker, because the properties used to derive the second bound are not symmetric for
ﬁrms and workers.
Take-It-or-Leave-It Wage Oﬀer by the Firm. A ﬁrm of type y oﬀers a wage wM to the
job applicant, who is then indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting it to stay unemployed
when his amenity value is exactly zM = n−wM. If z ≥ zM, and the oﬀer is accepted, an event
with chance 1−FZ(zM), the ﬁrm earns ﬂow proﬁts p+y−wM = p−n+y+zM. Equivalently,
the ﬁrm chooses the threshold zM, rather than the wage wM, to maximize the PDV of:
[1 − FZ(zM)](p − n + y + zM). (9)
The well-known ﬁrst order condition is





The left hand side is the gain from trading with an additional worker. However, if the ﬁrm
wants to trade with more workers, it has to pay higher informational rents to the workers
(types, values of z) it is already trading with. The right hand side gives the number of
workers that receive higher rents relative to the number of workers gained from reducing zM.
29If (10) has an interior solution zM(p−n+y), by Assumption 1, this is unique, diﬀerentiable,
and the global maximizer. Assumption 1 allows for ﬁnite lower and upper bounds, so zM(p−
n + y) could be at a corner, equal to the lower bound z (the oﬀer is accepted for sure) if
p−n+y+z ≥ [F ′
Z(z)]−1, that is if the gain from trading with more workers always outweighs
the cost of higher informational rents, and equal to the upper bound ¯ z (the oﬀer is rejected
for sure) if p − n + y + ¯ z ≤ 0. One may expect that corner solutions may generate suﬃcient
wage rigidity to escape the bounds. We will show that this is not the case.
From acceptance of its oﬀer, the ﬁrm learns that the type of the worker is at least zM(p−
n+y). Although it has obtained this information, the ﬁrm would not want to revise its wage
oﬀer if it were allowed to do so.17 Thus the key assumption regarding commitment is not that
the ﬁrm can commit not to make a lower wage oﬀer after acceptance, but that it can commit
not to make a higher wage oﬀer after being rejected.
It is now straightforward to map this model of wage determination into the notation of
Section 2, and check that it satisﬁes the properties there introduced:
G(y,z,p,n) = x(y,z,p − n)
z − zM(p − n + y)
r + δ
,
J(y,z,p,n) = x(y,z,p − n)
p − n + y + zM(p − n + y)
r + δ
,
x(y,z,p − n) = I{z ≥ zM(p − n + y)}. (11)
The trade decision x depends on p and n only through their diﬀerence p−n. Moreover, the
same is true for the functions G and J and for their unconditional counterparts, that we can
write as ξ(p−n), G(p−n) and J(p−n) from now on. Inspecting the ﬁrm’s objective in (9),
an increase in p−n+y raises the marginal gain from trade by lowering the threshold zM. By
a monotone comparative statics argument, or by the implicit function theorem, zM(p−n+y)
is weakly decreasing (and strictly so over the range where the solution is interior). Consulting
Equation (11), this implies that x(y,z,p−n) is non-decreasing in both y and z, and Condition
1 (c) is veriﬁed. As discussed earlier, for the ﬁrst bound we just need G′(p−n), J ′(p−n) ≥ 0.
Deﬁne the worker’s average gains from trading with a ﬁrm of type y:
(r + δ)G(p − n|y) ≡
  ¯ z
zM(p−n+y)
[z − zM(p − n + y)]dFZ(z).
17Formally, the objective of the ﬁrm facing the distribution of worker types truncated at zM(p − n + y) is
given by p−n+y+zM for zM ≤ zM(p−n+y) and
1−FZ(zM)
1−FZ(zM(p−n+y))(p−n+y+zM) for zM ≥ zM(p−n+y).
The unique maximizer is still zM(p − n + y).
30This function is diﬀerentiable everywhere, including at the two threshold values of y where
the ﬁrst order condition (10) holds with equality for the corners z and ¯ z, with
(r + δ)G
′(p − n|y) = −z
′
M(p − n + y)[FZ(zM(p − n + y))] ≥ 0.
The ﬁrm expands the range of workers it is trading with by −z′
M(p−n+y), so the informational
rents of all worker types that it is already trading with have to increase by exactly this amount.
If zM(p−n+y) is at a corner z or ¯ z, clearly z′
M(p−n+y) = 0 and the inequality still applies.
By deﬁnition G(p − n) =
 
G(p − n|y)dFY(y), so that
G
′(p − n) =
 
G
′(p − n|y)dFY(y) ≥ 0.
For the ﬁrm, the maximized value for type y is
(r + δ)J(p − n|y) = [1 − FZ(zM(p − n + y))[p − n + y + zM(p − n + y)].
Diﬀerentiation yields
(r + δ)J
′(p − n|y) = 1 − FZ(zM(p − n + y)).
If the ﬁrm is at a corner this follows immediately, as zM(p − n + y) does not respond to a
change in p−n. If the solution to the ﬁrm’s problem is interior, this relationship follows from
the envelope theorem. Since the threshold zM is chosen optimally, the ﬁrm cannot gain at
the margin from adjusting the threshold, so the beneﬁt from an increase in p − n is just the
direct eﬀect on the rents that the ﬁrm earns from the workers that it is already trading with.
It follows that J(p−n|y) is continuously diﬀerentiable, and diﬀerentiation under the integral
sign yields
(r + δ)J






[1 − FZ(zM(p − n + y))]dFY(y) = ξ(p − n) ≥ 0.
This also establishes that Condition 2 holds with equality. Recall our discussion that Condition







= ξ. Here Condition 2 again follows from the envelope theorem which
delivers (r +δ)∂J
∂p = ξ. At the same time, due to the monopoly ineﬃciency, trade is generally







We summarize these results in the following:
31Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1 the model of wage determination through a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer by the ﬁrm to a privately informed worker satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2 and
Increasing worker rents. Thus, both labor market volatility bounds of Propositions 1 and 2
apply.
Take-It-or-Leave-It Wage Request by the Worker. By symmetry with the case that
we just analyzed, when the worker makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage request from the ﬁrm,
Condition 1 is satisﬁed and worker rents are Increasing. These are all the properties needed
to apply the weak bound of Proposition 1.
To apply the strong bound, we cannot invoke symmetry with the previous case: there, we
only established that the rents of the oﬀer-making party satisfy Condition 2, while now the
ﬁrm is at the receiving end of the oﬀer. Using notation symmetric to the ﬁrm oﬀer model, in
the worker request model
(r + δ)J
′(p − n|z) = −y
′
M(p − n + z)[1 − FY(yM(p − n + z))] (12)
at points of diﬀerentiability of yM(p − n + z), the threshold productivity level chosen by
the worker with amenity value z. Only ﬁrm types that the worker has already been trading
with experience an increase in their informational rent, which is why the probability of trade
1−FY(yM(p−n+z)) appears in Equation (12). How large the increase in the informational
rent is for these ﬁrm types depends on how many more ﬁrm types the worker wants to trade
with, that is, on the drop in the threshold −y′
M(p −n +z). If the worker reduces the request
and thus the feasible productivity threshold substantially, then the ﬁrm will experience a large
increase in its informational rents. Now suppose that the worker reduces the threshold less
than one for one with an increase in p − n, that is −y′
M(p − n + z) ≤ 1. Then
(r + δ)J




M(p − n + z)[1 − FY(yM(p − n + z))]dFZ(z)
≤
 
[1 − FY(yM(p − n + z))]dFZ(z) = ξ(p − n),
enough for Condition 2. The following strengthening of the second part of Assumption 1
suﬃces for −y′
M ≤ 1.
Assumption 2. (Monotone Hazard Rate) The hazard rate
F′
Y (y)
1−FY (y) is weakly increasing
and continuously diﬀerentiable on [y, ¯ y].
32To understand the role of a monotone hazard rate, consult the worker’s ﬁrst order condition
for an optimal wage request to the ﬁrm:





If in response to an increase in p − n the worker reduced yM one for one, then the left hand
side, which is the marginal beneﬁt from trading with another ﬁrm type, would be unchanged.
However, under Assumption 2 the worker would end up at a point with a lower hazard rate,
that is the loss of trade associated with a more aggressive wage request would be smaller
relative to the number of ﬁrms that would pay the higher wage. It follows that it is optimal
to reduce the threshold less than one for one.
Thus we obtain the following:
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 the model of wage determination through a take-it-or-
leave-it request by the worker to a privately informed ﬁrm satisﬁes Condition 1 and Increasing
worker rents. Thus, the weak labor market volatility bound of Proposition 1 applies. If As-
sumption 1 is strengthened to Assumption 2, then this model also satisﬁes Condition 2 and
the strong volatility bound of Proposition 2 also applies.
Kennan (2006) also considers the model with take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, and he is able to
generate large ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies. As discussed in the introduction,
his approach exploits asymmetric information in a diﬀerent way from what we consider in this
paper. We ask how the presence of asymmetric information changes the response of the labor
market to an increase in aggregate labor productivity, but the extent of private information
itself is acyclical. In contrast, in Kennan (2006) exogenous ﬂuctuations in the shape of the
distribution of types are the key driving force of labor market ﬂuctuations. Speciﬁcally, he
assumes that the match speciﬁc productivity component can be either high or low, and that
the high value is more likely in booms. He assumes that parameters are such that pooling
occurs in both booms and recessions: workers always request the wage that makes the low
ﬁrm type indiﬀerent. Since the value of unemployment is procyclical, it follows that worker
rents are countercyclical.18
18 Translated into our notation, in Kennan (2006) both p and FY vary over the cycle. It is straightforward
to decompose labor market volatility into three sources: p, FY , and an interaction term. In his calibration
33In Section 3.2 we demonstrated that the strong labor market volatility bound can be
attained by the model of complete rent rigidity. We now show that there exist beliefs such
that the monopoly model also attains the bound.
Attaining the Strong Bound in Firm Oﬀer Monopoly. The idea is to construct beliefs
such that the monopoly model maps exactly into the model of complete rent rigidity, that is
the worker receives a ﬁxed ﬂow rent g > 0. For simplicity there is no heterogeneity on the ﬁrm
side, that is FY is degenerate. Let w = b+
r+δ+f
r+δ g. As in the model with complete rent rigidity,
this turns out to be the equilibrium annuity value of wages. Let j = p − w = p − b −
r+δ+f
r+δ g,








with support [z, ¯ z] where the lower bound is z = −g and the upper bound is chosen to insure
a zero mean, that is it is the unique positive solution to the equation
  ¯ z
z zFZ(dz) = 0. We will
show that in steady state the ﬁrm trades with all worker types. Steady state ﬂow rents are
p−n = g+j. More importantly, we show that trading with all worker types remains optimal
in response to a productivity shock, which in turn implies G′(g + j) = 0. Thus this example
maps exactly into the model of complete rent rigidity.
First note that if the ﬁrm chooses to trade with all worker types, then ﬂow worker rents
are
(r + δ)
  ¯ z
z
(z − ¯ z)dFZ(z) = −z = g.
Furthermore, if ﬂow worker rents are g, then equilibrium condition (3) implies that in equi-
librium p−n = g+j. Thus it remains to show that it is indeed optimal for the ﬁrm to choose
the lower bound z for a neighborhood around p − n = g + j. Evaluating the objective of the
ﬁrm at p − n = g + j yields







z + g + j
¯ z + g + j
 
,
a strictly decreasing function of z.
While monopoly can attain the bound for some beliefs, this is not to say that it generically
leads to ampliﬁcation vis-a-vis Nash bargaining. It is easy to construct beliefs such that the
ﬂuctuations in FY alone generate about 85 percent of observed volatility in the v-u ratio, while the contribution
of p and of the interaction term are small.
34response of the labor market to a productivity shock is muted. Indeed, in his conjecture
Shimer (2005) merely argues that the model breaks the direct link between labor productivity
and the v-u ratio by making the response to a productivity shock a function of the hazard
rate. Thus at least the model adds may degrees of freedom that one may expect should
enable the model to match observed volatility. Our results imply that this is not the case:
the degrees of freedom are not enough to generate ampliﬁcation in excess of the strong labor
market volatility bound. Moreover, if one chooses the distribution of beliefs to maximize
ampliﬁcation, one obtains precisely complete rent rigidity.
4.2 Strategic Bargaining with One-Sided Private Information
We now move away from the case of extreme commitment to a (take-it-or-leave-it) oﬀer, and
towards repeated, strategic bargaining. The theory of sequential non-cooperative bargaining
with private information has produced compelling predictions only for the case of one-sided
asymmetric information, that we address ﬁrst. In the two-sided case, the wealth of Bayesian
equilibria makes alternating-oﬀer games problematic as tools of analysis, despite the realism
of the setup. In that case, we will consider the unique allocation that maximizes expected
gains from trade through a mediator.
We focus on some popular and natural extensive forms of the bargaining game. In the
previous subsection we analyzed the case of a unilateral oﬀer with commitment to a privately
informed party. In that case, the private information of the oﬀer-making party is irrelevant,
so that solution applies both to one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information. We showed
that our bounds apply. Therefore, we now assume that parties cannot commit to walk away
when the opponent declines its oﬀer, but they can commit to their oﬀer should it be accepted.
The only change in the environment is that information is private only on one side. To
ﬁx ideas, assume that the ﬁrm is uninformed about z but the worker observes y. The parties
then enter a bargaining phase. The ﬁrm (uninformed party) makes the ﬁrst wage oﬀer w. If
this is accepted, from then until the (exogenous) end of the match the ﬁrm has ﬂow proﬁts
p+y−w, the worker has ﬂow payoﬀs w+z−n, the total surplus is p+y+z−n. If negotiations
end unsuccessfully, the ﬁrm obtains zero and the worker obtains a ﬂow value n. Fix numbers
β ∈ [0,1], ρwork ≥ 0, ρfirm ≥ 0. If the ﬁrst oﬀer is declined, negotiations break down with
35chance 1−e−(1−β)∆, continue with chance e−(1−β)∆ and, after a delay ∆ and with discounting
cost e−ρfirm∆, the worker makes a new wage request. Again, if this is declined by the ﬁrm,
negotiations break down with chance 1−e−β∆ and continue with complementary probability,
in which case payoﬀs are further discounted at rate e−ρwork∆. Notice then that the discount
rate after a ﬁrm oﬀer is declined is eﬀectively equal to 1−β+ρfirm, and after a worker oﬀer is
declined it equals β +ρwork. We study Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBE) when ∆ → 0.
This model nests several well-known models as special cases. First, let the uninformed
party i ∈ {work,firm} make the ﬁrst oﬀer. If the discount rate ρi that applies after the ﬁrst
oﬀer is inﬁnite, we are back to the previous case of monopoly with commitment. Therefore,
from now on we assume ρi < ∞. We analyze ﬁrst the simpler case where repeated oﬀers are
eﬀectively one-sided.
Coase Conjecture. Suppose again for illustration that the ﬁrm is uninformed and β =
ρwork = 0 ≤ ρfirm < ∞. In this case, any request by the worker can be rejected at no cost by
the ﬁrm, because negotiations continue for sure and there is no discounting after a worker’s
request is declined, but declining a ﬁrm’s oﬀer implies an eﬃciency loss (1 − β > 0). Thus,
oﬀers are eﬀectively one-sided. This is the case of a monopolist (ﬁrm) selling a durable good
(job) to a buyer (worker) who has private information about his own valuation (z) for the job.
The ﬁrm (uninformed) makes the ﬁrst oﬀer. As is well-known, the unique PBE as ∆ → 0
dictates that negotiations end immediately and the worker extracts all rents from the ﬁrm,
the Coase Conjecture (Gul and Wilson (1986)). We now examine the properties of this model
of wage determination. We have two subcases.
In the Gap case the ﬁrm’s draw of match productivity y is such that there are gains from
trade for sure, p + y + z − n > 0. Then the sequential equilibrium wage of the subgame
following the observation of y is w(p,n,y) = n − z < p + y, all worker types accept if payoﬀs
are w + z − n = z − z > 0, the ﬁrm makes proﬁts p + y − w = p − n + y + z > 0. In the
No-Gap case, given productivity y, gains from trade exist only for some worker types z, such
that p+y +z −n ≤ 0 < p+y + ¯ z −n. Then, the unique equilibrium satisfying a stationarity
condition on strategies has the following outcome. The wage oﬀer w(p,n,y) = p+y is accepted
immediately, the ﬁrm is left with nothing, workers with z ≥ n − (p + y) accept and obtain
rents p + y + z − n, the other worker types decline.
36Trade is ex post eﬃcient, so the ex ante probability of trade is simply ξ(p − n) = Pr(p −
n + y + z ≥ 0) and Condition 1 (c) is veriﬁed. Notice that once again not only the trade
decision but also the split of rents depends on p and n only through their diﬀerence p − n.
We are left to verify G′, J ′ ≥ 0. The ﬁrm’s rents are
(r + δ)J(p − n) = Ey,z [p + y − w(p,n,y)] =
  ¯ y
n−p−z
(p − n + y + z)dFY(y)
with
(r + δ)J
′(p − n) = 1 − FY(n − p − z) ∈ [0,ξ(p − n)]
implying Conditions 1 (b) and 2. The fact that trade is ex post eﬃcient implies that (r +
δ)(G′ + J ′) = ξ, so it immediately follows that (r + δ)G′ ∈ [0,ξ]. Therefore, the worker and
ﬁrm informational rents have symmetric properties, and we can swap their roles. These facts
establish:
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1 the “Coase Conjecture” model of wage determination
through quickly repeated unilateral oﬀers by the uninformed party in stationary strategies satis-
ﬁes Conditions 1 and 2 and Increasing worker rents. Thus, the labor market volatility bounds
of Propositions 1 and 2 apply.
Menzio (2005b) proposes a model of wage determination that delivers the same implications
as the Coase conjecture, albeit through a diﬀerent mechanism. In his model workers are
uninformed. As under the Coase conjecture, the wage requested by the worker in equilibrium
is given by the productivity of the lowest ﬁrm type: w = p+y. The mechanism is as follows.
The ﬁrm employs many workers. If the ﬁrm grants a wage in excess of p + y to one worker,
then all its other employees learn that the ﬁrm’s type is higher than y, and they successfully
request wage increases. This spillover of information enables the ﬁrm to reject wage requests
in excess of p + y. As the implied wage is the same as under the Coase conjecture, it follows
that the labor market volatility bounds apply to this model of wage determination as well, as
long as private information is acyclical as it is assumed to be here. Menzio uses this model to
generate rigid wages as follows. He assumes that the lower bound of the distribution of ﬁrm
productivity is acyclical. Translated into our notation, p+y remains constant over the cycle.
As aggregate labor productivity is higher in booms while the lower bound is acyclical, it must
be that the shape of the distribution FY is changing over the cycle. Thus Menzio’s approach
37is similar to Kennan (2006) in the sense that it relies on exogenous ﬂuctuations in the shape
of the distribution of types in order to generate large labor market ﬂuctuations.
Alternating Oﬀers. Now suppose that β ∈ (0,1), so declining an oﬀer can always lead to
a breakdown in negotiations, and ρfirm = ρwork = r ≥ 0. These assumptions provide some
physical commitment to parties to walk away after receiving a negative answer to an oﬀer, and
enhance the bargaining power of the uninformed party. We illustrate equilibrium predictions
drawing from Grossman and Perry (1986), Gul and Sonnenschein (1988), and Menzio (2005a).
In this game, Stationarity of equilibrium strategies is not suﬃcient to pin down a unique
PBE, and one needs to impose also a Monotonicity requirement on beliefs. Then, the unique
PBE is similar to the Coase conjecture, with the only twist that β measures the bargaining
power of the worker. That is, suppose now (for the sake of variety) that the ﬁrm is privately
informed about y, while z is common knowledge and the worker of type z makes the ﬁrst
wage request. Then, in the Gap case, p+y+z − n > 0, the unique PBE wage ﬁrst requested
by the worker of type z (and accepted by all ﬁrms) is w(p,n,z) = β(p+y) + (1 − β)(n − z)
and the worker obtains payoﬀ z − n + w = β(p+y+z − n). That is, the wage must reﬂect
the worker’s valuation because with some probability (decreasing in β): negotiations break
down, the ﬁrm does not get its turn to counteroﬀer and it loses everything. This makes the
ﬁrm more willing to accept a high wage requests, the more so the higher β. The ﬁrm earns
p + y − w(p,n,z) = y − βy + (1 − β)(p − n + z). In the No-Gap case, the worker requests
w(p,n,z) = β(p + n − p − z)+ (1 − β)(n − z) = n − z and is left with zero payoﬀs, the ﬁrm
accepts if y ≥ n−p−z and earns p+y−w(p,n,z) = p+y−n+z. So the outcome is diﬀerent
from that of one-sided repeated oﬀers only in the Gap case.
The chance of trading ξ(p−n) is the same as in the previous model, so it satisﬁes Condition
1 (c), and
(r + δ)G(p − n) = β
  ¯ z
n−p−y
(p + y + z − n)dFZ(z).
Hence
(r + δ)G
′(p − n) = β
 
1 − FZ(n − p − y)
 
∈ (0,ξ(p − n)).
By the ex post eﬃciency of trade, this implies (r+δ)J ′(p−n) = ξ(p−n)−(r+δ)G′(p−n) ∈
(0,ξ(p − n)). Again, these are the desired properties and are symmetric. We conclude:
38Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1 the model of wage determination through quickly re-
peated alternating oﬀers between an uninformed and an informed party, in stationary strate-
gies and monotone beliefs, satisﬁes Conditions 1 and 2 and Increasing worker rents. Thus,
both labor market volatility bounds of Propositions 1 and 2 apply.
4.3 Two-Sided Private Information: Constrained Eﬃcient Alloca-
tion
The theory of strategic bargaining in the presence of bilateral asymmetric information, whether
with one-sided or alternating oﬀers, has not produced compelling (unique) predictions based
on the Perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium notion even after restricting the space of strategies
by requirements such as stationarity of strategies and monotonicity of beliefs. The wealth of
reasonable oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs simply sustains many robust equilibria, even after applying
additional reﬁnements.
We then turn to the constrained eﬃcient allocation that maximizes expected gains from
trade, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), henceforth MS83. This corresponds to the
eﬃcient allocation where both parties receive equal weight in the welfare function. Parties have
access to a mediator, who receives announcements about the draws of private information, y
and z, and recommends a binding allocation: a trading decision and a wage. After learning
their type, parties are willing to participate in the mechanism and truthfully reveal their
types. In this wage negotiation context, the mediator enforcing the rules of the game can be
thought of as an arbitrator of a labor dispute. The resulting constrained eﬃcient allocation
can be implemented with a multiplicity of payment functions, but importantly it produces a
unique sharing of expected rents. This allocation is of great interest for its uniqueness, which
allows us to apply our test, and for two additional reasons: it features the maximal expected
gains from trade in the equilibrium of any unmediated bargaining game and, for some classes
of belief distributions, it can be implemented through a sealed-bid double auction. In this
subsection, we show that our weak bound from Proposition 1 applies to this allocation too.
We have not been able to either establish or disprove Condition 2 and the strong bound.
The Mechanism Design Problem. A mediator, or principal, receives reports ˆ y and ˆ z by
the two parties and enforces a probability of trade x(ˆ y, ˆ z,p,n) and a wage w(ˆ y, ˆ z,p,n) so as
39to maximize the sum of expected values to the two parties. The reports are a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this optimal mechanism. That is, the eﬃcient mechanism is a direct revelation
game whose Bayesian Nash equilibrium produces the constrained eﬃcient allocation.
Given a pair of reports ˆ y, ˆ z and realizations y,z, the ﬁrm’s value is
(r + δ)J(ˆ y, ˆ z,y,p,n) = p + y − w(ˆ y, ˆ z,p,n)
and the worker’s value is




The constrained eﬃcient allocation obtained through a direct revelation mechanism max-
imizes the total expected value to ﬁrm and worker
max
x,w
  ¯ z
z
  ¯ y
y
[J(y,z,y,p,n) + W(y,z,z,p,n)]x(y,z,p,n)dFY (y)dFZ (z)
+
  ¯ z
z
  ¯ y
y
U [1 − x(y,z,p,n)]dFY(y)dFZ (z)
subject to (interim) Individual Rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints
of the ﬁrm: for all y, ˆ y ∈ [y, ¯ y]
  ¯ z
z
J(y,z,y,p,n)x(y,z,p,n)dFZ (z) ≥ max
 
0,
  ¯ z
z
J(ˆ y,z,y,p,n)x(ˆ y,z)dFZ (z)
 
and of the worker: for all z, ˆ z ∈ [z, ¯ z]
  ¯ y
y




  ¯ y
y
{W(y, ˆ z,z,p,n)x(y, ˆ z) + U [1 − x(y, ˆ z,p,n)]}dFY(y)
 
.
Notice that this is not a constrained eﬃcient allocation for society: here parties take the
outside option n = rU as given, and just mind the division of rents. The objective function is
independent of the wage w, which only plays the role of a transfer function to induce parties to
truthfully reveal their valuations, thus only enters the IC and IR constraints. In the appendix
we prove:
Lemma 7. Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique constrained eﬃcient trading rule: trade
iﬀ y ≥ y∗(z,p − n) where the decreasing function y∗ = y∗(z,p − n) uniquely solves
y













40and µ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint
  ¯ z
z
  ¯ y
y∗(z,p−n)
 









dFY(y)dFZ (z) ≥ 0
which is equivalent to all IC and IR constraints.
The ex post probability of trade is x∗(y,z,p − n) = I{y ≥ y∗(z,p − n)} and the ex ante
chance of trade, unconditional on private information, is
ξ
∗(p − n) =
  ¯ z
z
[1 − FY(y
∗(z,p − n))]dFZ(z) =
  ¯ y
y
[1 − FZ(z
∗(y,p − n))]dFY(y). (14)
Corner solutions are encompassed: if y∗(z) <y for some worker type z, this and all higher
types z′ > z who like the job even better than z are sure to trade. Conversely if y∗(z) > ¯ y for
some worker type z, this and all lower types z′ < z who like the job even less than z are sure
not to trade. Notice that the ex post eﬃcient trading rule, trade iﬀ y + p − n + z ≥ 0, holds
if and only if the constraint is not binding, or µ = 0. This happens in the Gap case, when
p − n is large enough that the supports of p + y and z − n are disjoint.
We can also state the constrained eﬃcient trading rule in terms of the worker’s private
value: trade occurs iﬀ z ≥ z∗(y,p − n) = y∗−1(y,p − n). Either way, the higher the valuation
a party has for the match, the more likely she expects trade to be. By the implicit function
theorem, these cutoﬀ functions y∗ and z∗ are also diﬀerentiable in p − n. We now move to
verify the conditions stated at the beginning of this Section 4.
Expected Rents. As shown in MS83, the expected value to each party, unconditional on
trade but conditional on private information, can be written as
(r + δ)G

















Notice that G∗(z|p,n) is increasing in z and J ∗(y|p,n) is increasing in y, so the IR constraints
G∗(z|p,n) ≥ 0 and J ∗(y|p,n) ≥ 0 for each type of worker and ﬁrm are satisﬁed if they are for




41Taking expectations w.r. to private information, we obtain the expected values to each party
unconditional on trade and on private information. In the second and fourth equalities we
use integration by parts:
(r + δ)G
∗(p − n) =











  ¯ z
z
[1 − FY(y
∗(z,p − n))][1 − FZ(z)]dz
=
  ¯ z
z
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Notice the analogy with the monopoly model: a trading party enjoys expected rents equal to
the expected diﬀerence between its own valuation and the minimum acceptable valuation for
trade.
These rents are uniquely deﬁned by the trading rule y∗, that we proved to uniquely exist,
and do not depend on the payment function w∗, which is deﬁned residually. Therefore, G∗ and
J ∗ are uniquely deﬁned as functions of p − n only.
Verifying the Conditions. Lemma 7 immediately implies Condition 1 (c). In the Appen-
dix, we prove the key result:
Lemma 8. G∗′(p − n) ≥ 0.
Since the roles of the worker and the ﬁrm in the mechanism design problem are symmetric,
as long as both distributions of types satisfy Assumption 1, we also obtain J ∗′(p − n) ≥ 0.
Intuitively, when the average gains from trade p − n rise, the mediator optimally re-adjusts
his mechanism so as to spread the beneﬁts across both parties. One might expect that, in
situations where private information is lopsided and the IC constraint is much more binding for
one party, larger gains from trade p−n might be used by the mediator to relax that constraint
42and to greatly increase the chance of trade. This may require reducing the expected payoﬀs
to the other party. Lemma 8 shows that this is impossible. Under bilateral asymmetric
information satisfying Assumption 1, labor market ﬂuctuations of the empirically observed
magnitude are a symptom of wage-setting institutions that, albeit not necessarily privately
ineﬃcient in the Pareto sense, do not fully exploit all possible gains from trade.
Proposition 9. Under bilateral asymmetric information satisfying Assumption 1, the con-
strained eﬃcient model of wage determination, in which a mediator maximizes ex ante expected
gains from trade, satisﬁes Condition 1 and Increasing worker rents. Therefore, the labor mar-
ket volatility bound of Proposition 1 applies.
4.4 Summary
There are essentially two kinds of allocations that emerge in the games that we considered.
Either one party is left with no rents, as in the Coase conjecture, or an interior trading
cutoﬀ on private information is chosen to maximize the rents of one or both parties, as in
the models of take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers and the constrained eﬃcient allocation. In the former
case, our conditions apply trivially. In the latter, they follow in part from an implication of
optimality, the envelope theorem.
The various models that we analyzed suggest a connection between private (in)eﬃciency
of wage setting and labor market volatility. To this purpose, it is useful to describe the Pareto
frontier under bilateral asymmetric information, interim participation and incentive compat-
ibility constraints. Barring transfers between parties at the ex ante stage, the constrained
eﬃcient allocation is just one point on this frontier, right in the middle of it where both
parties receive equal weights. The extreme points of the frontier correspond to take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers, where one party obtains all the weight. Although the entire frontier of this
trading problem has not been fully characterized, in these three benchmark cases (points on
the frontier) either one or both of our bounds apply. We conjecture that all the allocations
on the frontier, for any given Pareto weights that do not change with aggregate productivity
p, satisfy our conditions for volatility bounds. Verifying this conjecture is a task for future
research. Some of the strategic bargaining models that we considered feature ineﬃciency but
no ampliﬁcation, so ineﬃciency in wage setting may be necessary but is certainly not suﬃcient
43for ampliﬁcation of aggregate labor productivity shocks.
For belief distributions that give rise to linear “virtual valuations” (as deﬁned in Assump-
tion 1) the unique constrained eﬃcient allocation can be implemented through a sealed-bid
double auction (Satterthwaite and Williams 1989), the same mechanism as in Hall (2005), but
cannot provide the desired ampliﬁcation. Yet, the double auction with two-sided asymmetric
information has multiple equilibria that are privately Pareto undominated, although they do
not maximize average gains from trade. Therefore, Hall’s mechanism, based on an appropriate
selection from the set of Pareto undominated equilibria, might still deliver the desired wage
rigidity and ampliﬁcation with private information. Verifying this conjecture is diﬃcult, for
two reasons. First, any amount of asymmetric information restricts the equilibrium set of the
double-auction, relative to the latitude exploited by Hall in the complete information case.
Second, the literature has not found a complete characterization of this equilibrium set. So
we leave also this conjecture for future research.
5 Transitory Aggregate Productivity Shocks
We have justiﬁed our focus on permanent productivity shocks claiming that labor market
volatility is even smaller if shocks are transitory. Thus the labor market volatility bounds
should still apply if shocks are not fully permanent. In this section we show that this is the
case, generalizing the labor market volatility bounds to an economy that switches between a
high state pH and a low state pL of aggregate labor productivity. Transitions from the high
state to the low state occur at rate λ
L, reverse transitions at rate λ
H. As an illustration
we generalize the ﬁrm oﬀer monopoly model to this environment and demonstrate that the
bounds apply.
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44for the opportunity cost of the worker.19 A model of wage determination is now a sextuple
{GH,GL,JH,JL,xH,xL} where for instance GH(y,z,pH,pL,nH,nL) is the initial worker rent
from a match formed in a high aggregate state with idiosyncratic productivity component y
and amenity value z. Worker rents of matches created in the high state depend on pL and nL
because labor productivity is no longer completely persistent and the match may eventually
ﬁnd itself in the low state. The probability of trade is now a more complicated object. Let
h(s) denote the history of a match of age s. It includes the history of the aggregate state
and the history of trade within the match between match formation and the time at which
it reaches age s. Then xH(y,z,pH,nH,pL,nL,h(s)) denotes the probability of trade at age
s after history h(s). The sum GH + JH is the joint present value of the match induced by
the trade probability xH. The ex ante functions GH, GL, J H, J L are deﬁned analogously to
Equation (1). Thus GH(pH,nH,pL,nL) is the ex ante worker rent of a match created in the
high aggregate state. We make the natural assumption that for identical states pH = pL and
nH = nL the model maps into the case we already studied: rents do not depend on the state












and Equation (1) yields the corresponding ex ante functions G, J and ξ.
For the case of permanent shocks we derived upper bounds on the elasticity of the v-u ratio
with respect to aggregate labor productivity p. Analogously, here we derive upper bounds on











































19In standard notation Equation (16) for the high state reads




Thus here nH = rUH − λ
L(UL − UH) and by symmetry nL = rUL − λ
H(UH − UL). As before
GH(pH,nH,pL,nL) = WH(pH,nH,pL,nL) − UH where WH(pH,nH,pL,nL) is the utility of a worker in
a job created in the high state.
45and an analogous formula holds for the coeﬃcient of variation of productivity
σp
µp. Next we
provide the natural generalization of Condition 1 for this environment.
Condition 1′. The model of wage determination {GH,GL,JH,JL,xH,xL} satisﬁes three
properties:
(a) The partial eﬀect of aggregate labor productivity in the high state pH on the diﬀerence





(b) The partial eﬀect of worker’s opportunity cost in the high states nH on the diﬀerence in





(c) The trade probabilities xH and xL depend on pH and nH only through their diﬀerence
pH −nH, on pL and nL only through their diﬀerence pL −nL, and are weakly increasing
in both match-speciﬁc outcomes, the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic productivity y and the worker’s
amenity value for the job z.
To see that this is a generalization of Condition 1, consider for instance part (a). Suppose
productivity shocks are permanent. Then ∂GL
∂pH = 0: productivity in the high state is irrelevant
for rents in the low state as the low state lasts forever. Moreover ∂GH
∂pH = ∂G
∂pH because the high
state lasts forever. Thus Condition 1′ (a) reduces to Condition 1 (a) if productivity shocks
are permanent.
5.1 Weak Labor Market Volatility Bound
To derive the weak bound we also need a generalization of Increasing worker rents.
Deﬁnition 1′. (Increasing Worker Rents) In a model of wage determination












46Our approach to deriving the bounds in this setting is as follows. As before we consider
small productivity shocks. Speciﬁcally, we linearize the model around a steady state with
productivity p. That is, the two productivity values pH, pL must satisfy λH
λH+λLpH+ λH
λH+λLpH =
p. Importantly, with respect to the transition rates λ
H and λ
L we provide an upper bound,
that is the bounds apply not only if λ
H and λ




First we note a fact that will be convenient in the linearization. In what follows all
derivatives are evaluated at (p,n,p,n) where n is the steady state opportunity cost of the









and an analogous relationship holds among the derivatives of GH and GL. These relationships
allow us to compactly write the linearization of the model using only the derivatives with




























































from Equation (16). The second term on the right hand side of Equation (20) capture the
change in worker rents. This leads to the following deﬁnition of procyclical worker rents for
the linearized model:



















In the appendix we prove the following version of Proposition 1 for the linearized model:
Proposition 1′. (Weak Volatility Bound) If the model of wage determination satisﬁes




µθ ≤ ¯ εθ,WEAK. If worker rents are
Increasing, then they are Procyclical.
475.2 Strong Labor Market Volatility Bound
For the strong bound a generalization of Condition 2 is needed.










In the appendix we prove the following for the linearized model:
Proposition 2′. (Strong Volatility Bound) If the model of wage determination satisﬁes




µθ ≤ ¯ εθ,STRONG.
5.3 Monopoly
We consider take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by the ﬁrm and analyze the case without ﬁrm hetero-
geneity for simplicity. Again the ﬁrm has the power to commit not to make further oﬀers to
workers that have rejected an oﬀer. It does not matter whether the ﬁrm also can commit not
to make further oﬀer to workers who accepted an oﬀer. Thus we could assume that the ﬁrm
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of a contract which speciﬁes wage payments conditional on the
history of the aggregate state, and has the ability to commit to this contract. Or we could let
the ﬁrm change the wage whenever it ﬁnds it optimal to do so (but importantly, never makes
a follow up oﬀer to workers who reject a wage change). Both cases lead to the same outcome,
which takes the following form. First consider a match created in the low state. Optimal ﬁrm





























To understand this expression, recall that in the absence of transitions between the two states,
the ﬁrm would like to trade with more worker types in the high state. Here the ﬁrm starts in
the low state, but expects the match to be in the high state for part of its duration. In this
situation it is not optimal to hire workers only up to the point where proﬁts in the low state
(1 − FZ(z))
 
pL − nL + z
 
are maximized, because this constrains the set of worker types the
ﬁrm can trade with once the boom comes. This consideration leads to a kind of labor hoarding:
48the cutoﬀ chosen by the ﬁrm, denoted by zL
M(pH − nH,pL − nL), strikes a balance between




The situation is somewhat diﬀerent for a match created in the high state. The reason is
that hiring many worker types does not put a binding constraint on the set of worker types
the ﬁrm wants to trade with once the slump comes, because in the slump the ﬁrm actually
wants to shed worker types. Thus when a match is created in a boom, it is optimal to hire
worker types up to the point where proﬁts in the high state (1 − FZ(z))
 
pH − nH + z
 
are
maximized. Let zM(pH−nH) denote the corresponding cutoﬀ. Once the match enters a slump
for the ﬁrst time, it is essentially the same as a match created in the slump, and it is optimal
to shed workers below the threshold zL
M(pH − nH,pL − nL). Thus the ﬁrm rent is given by
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Having derived ﬁrm and worker rents for this model of wage determination, we now show
that both the weak and the strong bound apply. Condition 1′ (c) is clearly satisﬁed, as trade
follows a cutoﬀ rule, and the cutoﬀs depend on pH, nH, pL and nL only trough the diﬀerences






r + δ + λ
H + λ
L(1 − FZ(zM(p − n))) =
λ
H
r + δ + λ
H + λ
Lξ(p,n)
where we exploit the fact that zL
M(p−n,p−n) = zM(p−n). Diﬀerentiating J H with respect










r + δ + λ
H + λ
Lξ(p,n). (21)
This veriﬁes Condition 2′. Recall that with permanent shocks Condition 2 holds with equality.
Equation (21) is consistent with this result as the right hand side reduces to ξ(p − n) for
49λ
H = λ
L = 0. But with λ
H > 0 or λ
L > 0 there is some slack: ﬂuctuations in ﬁrm rents
across states and thereby labor market volatility are smaller if aggregate productivity shocks
are more transient. Condition 1′ (b) immediately follows as ∂J H

















is enough to show that ∂GH
∂pH − ∂GL





















Rents in the high state respond more to an increase in pH than rents in the low state if the
threshold zM declines more than the threshold zL
M. Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition
implicitly deﬁning zL
M
r + δ + λ
L






















(p − n,p − n) = −
λ
H















Thus the response of zL
M is proportional to the fraction of time the match spends in the high


















and it follows that worker rents are Increasing.
Proposition 3′. Under Assumption 1 the model of wage determination through a take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer by the ﬁrm to a privately informed worker satisﬁes Conditions 1′ and 2′ and
Increasing worker rents. Thus, both labor market volatility bounds of Propositions 1′ and 2′
apply.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have made two contributions to the debate on whether modiﬁcations to the
model of wage determination allow the search and matching model to generate larger labor
market ﬂuctuations in response to productivity shocks. First, we have shown that models of
50wage determination that cannot generate countercyclical rents, and thus at best generate rent
rigidity, are subject to labor market volatility bounds which are quantitatively tight. The
extent of ampliﬁcation generated by rent rigidity is thus quite limited, and quantitatively rent
rigidity is much closer to Nash bargaining than it is to wage rigidity. Second, for a sequence of
classic models of wage determination under asymmetric information we have shown that rents
are not countercyclical. Thus a model with asymmetric information in which merely rents are
rigid cannot be the silver bullet which allows the search and matching model to match the
magnitude of observed ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies. Allowing the model to do
so solely through a modiﬁcation of wage determination forces one to consider models that can
generate countercyclical rents. On the other hand, rent rigidity can generate a limited but not
insigniﬁcant amount of ampliﬁcation. A full answer to Shimer’s (2005) ﬁndings may involve
more than one modiﬁcation of the baseline model, of which a model of wage determination
with rigid rents could be one.
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52A Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 7. To solve this mechanism design problem, we appeal to MS83’s formula-
tion, and map our problem in their framework. Let υ ≡ p+y, ζ ≡ n−z, Φ(ζ) ≡ 1−FZ (n − ζ),
so Φ′ (ζ)dζ = F ′
Z (n − ζ)dζ = −F ′
Z (z)dz, Γ(υ) ≡ FY(υ − p), so Γ′ (υ)dυ = F ′
Y(υ − p)dυ =
F ′
Y(y)dy. Then the eﬃcient mechanism maximizes expected gains from trade subject to IC,
IR and budget balance.
max
x,w








[υ − w(ˆ υ,ζ)]x(ˆ υ,ζ)dΦ(ζ)
 
 
[w(υ,ζ) − ζ]x(υ,ζ)dΓ(υ) ≥ max
 
0,
   









This is the same formulation as in MS83. We apply their terminology and results. Let the
“virtual types” be
Qf (υ,α) ≡ υ − α
1 − Γ(υ)
Γ′ (υ)
and Qw (ζ,α) ≡ ζ + α
Φ(ζ)
Φ′ (ζ)
which are, respectively, increasing in υ and decreasing in ζ by Assumption 1. Then IR, IC
and budget balance are equivalent to
   
[Qf (υ,1) − Qw (ζ,1)]x(υ,ζ)dΦ(ζ)dΓ(y) ≥ 0





   
{υ − ζ + µ[Qf (υ,1) − Qw (ζ,1)]}x(υ,ζ)dΦ(ζ)dΓ(y)
where µ is the multiplier. The FOC is
x
∗ (υ,ζ) = I{υ − ζ + µ[Qf (υ,1) − Qw (ζ,1)] > 0} = I{Qf(υ,M) > Qw(ζ,M)}









so that trade occurs iﬀ υ > υ∗(ζ,M), which is the same as y ≥ y∗ ≡ υ∗ − p.
Assumption 1 implies that y∗ is decreasing in z, and that Qf(.,1) and Qw(.,1) are increas-
ing. Then Qf(υ,M) and Qw(ζ,M) are also increasing for every M ∈ [0,1] (see MS83 who
53state this without proof; there is a simple proof by contradiction). It follows (MS83 Theorem
2) that an eﬃcient mechanism exists, and the eﬃcient rule is: trade iﬀ υ > υ∗ (ζ,M) for a
cutoﬀ function υ∗ deﬁned implicitly by
υ
∗ (ζ,M) − ζ = M
 







Using our deﬁnitions, this is (13).
To show uniqueness, proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there exist two distinct
eﬃcient allocations {x∗
i}i=1,2. Given the nature of the optimal rule (trade if υ > υ∗ (ζ,M))
these two mechanisms must be associated with two diﬀerent values of the Lagrange multiplier,
M1 and M2 > M1. Then M2 > M1 ⇔ υ∗ (ζ,M2) > υ∗ (ζ,M1), which implies
x
∗
2 (υ,ζ) = x
∗




1 (υ,ζ) = 1 > 0 = x
∗





1 (υ,ζ) = x
∗
2 (υ,ζ) = 0 for all υ ≤ υ
∗ (ζ,M1)
Therefore








so that the second mechanism, associated with the higher Lagrange multiplier, yields a strictly
smaller objective function, and cannot be optimal.


























      
y=y∗(z,p−n)
(22)
and the analogous expression for z∗, which exist by the implicit function theorem.
There are two cases. First suppose that the Lagrange multiplier µ weakly declines in
average gains from trade p − n. Notice that as p − n → ∞ the incentive problem disappears,
and µ eventually vanishes, so this case must occur for a suﬃciently high value of p−n. Then
the trading cutoﬀ z∗(y,p − n) or y∗(z,p − n) strictly declines in p − n. From the above
expression for the rents, it is immediate to show both parties strictly gain. Intuitively, when
µ does not rise with p−n the incentive constraint is no more severe, so trade becomes no less
likely, and the planner still has additional gains from trade to distribute, so both parties gain.
Second, suppose that µ is (locally) strictly increasing in p−n. The IC constraint tightens,
and trading may become less likely. By the envelope theorem, the maximized total expected
gains from trade have derivative
G
∗′(p − n) + J





54So the claim is equivalent to
(1 + µ)ξ
∗(p − n) ≥ (r + δ)J
∗′(p − n) =













≤ 1 + µ.
for all z ∈ [z, ¯ z]. By contradiction, suppose this inequality is reversed for some   z ∈ [z, ¯ z].
Using (22) and multiplying through by the denominator of dy∗(  z,p − n)/d(p − n), which is








1 − FY(y∗(  z,p − n))
F ′
Y(y∗(  z,p − n))
+
1 − FZ (  z)
F ′
















The RHS is positive by µ > 0 and by Assumption 1. Therefore dµ/d(p − n) < 0, the desired
contradiction.

















































The proof proceeds in the same three steps followed in Section 3.1.
The ﬁrst step is to show that pH − pL ≤ nH − nL implies θ
H − θ
L ≤ 0. According to
Condition 1′ (c), total rents in both aggregate states depend only on the diﬀerences pH − nH





























Using this relationship to eliminate
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∂nH − ∂J L
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∂pH − ∂J L
∂pH
 
≤ 0 it follows immediately from Equation (19) in conjunction with Condition
1′ (b) that θ
H − θ
L ≤ 0. Otherwise the same implication follows from (19) together with
Condition 1′ (a) and Procyclical worker rents.






















r + δ + f
(w + ¯ z − b). (24)














r + δ + f
f
= ¯ εθ,WEAK.
The ﬁnal step is to show that if worker rents are Increasing, then they are Procyclical. Suppose
not. From the deﬁnition of Procyclicality it is clear that this can only occur if pH − pL <






































reveals that pH − pL < nH − nL together with Increasing worker rents implies that θ
H ≤ θ
L.
Consulting Equation (19), the supposition that worker rents are not Procyclical in conjunction
with θ
H ≤ θ
L yields the contradiction that nH ≤ nL.
Proof of Proposition 2′. Consider the case nH < nL. Given Increasing and thus Procycli-
cal worker rents, it is clear from Equation (19) that this implies θ
H − θ
L ≤ 0.



















Replacing J using the relationship J = ξ
p−w




















¯ p − b
 
¯ p − w






¯ p − b
1
1
η
r+δ+f
f
 −1
= ¯ εθ,STRONG.
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